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To investigate the relation between trust and formal institutions, we analyze bilateral trade 
patterns in a sample of 16 European countries between 1996-2009. Trust in trading partners 
has a significant positive effect on bilateral trade. However, our results suggest that trust and 
formal institutions are substitutes, as the positive effect of trust on trade is conditional on the 
quality of formal institutions. When the institutional quality of the importing country 
increases, the effect of trust on trade decreases, and eventually becomes insignificant. The 
decline in the effect of trust on trade is less when the exporting country’s institutional quality 
improves. 
JEL-Code: F100, Z100, K400. 
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 1. Introduction 
Several authors have pointed to the importance of institutions, often making a distinction 
between formal and informal institutions (North 1990; Hall and Jones 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson 2001; 2002; Kerekes and Williamson 2008). North (1994) and Williamson (2000) 
classify trust as an informal institution and the judicial system as a formal institution. Historical 
evidence suggests that both trust and formal institutions are important for the process  of 
economic development (Greif 1994; 2006; Boettke, Coyne and Leeson 2008). Trust, which is 
based on deeply rooted cultural traditions (Fukuyama 1995; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1993; 
Tabellini  2008a), is defined as the willingness to permit others’ actions to  influence one’s 
welfare (Sobel 2002). More precisely, an agent is willing to take a risk on the actions of others 
based on the belief that potential trustees will “do what is right” (Hoffman 2002).  
  Since contracts are usually incomplete, a trader has an incentive to expropriate the rights 
of another trader. To prevent opportunistic behaviour, such as hold-up, traders have to divert 
resources to monitoring and contract enforcement activities. Costs induced by these activities 
will shy away potential traders (Anderson 1999). Trust may mitigate these transaction costs and 
thereby affect economic outcomes. Studies have linked trust to economic growth (Knack and 
Keefer 1997; Zak and Knack 2001; Beugelsdijk, de Groot and van Schaik 2004, Francois and 
Zabojnik 2005), the amount of trade (Guiso,  Sapienza and Zingales  2009), government 
regulation and functioning (Aghion,  Algan,  Cahuc and Shleifer  2010;  Fine, 2001;  Putnam, 
Leonardi and Nanetti 1993) and size of the welfare state (Bjornskov and Bergh 2011).
1  
One recurring discussion concerns the nature of the relation between trust and formal 
institutions (Tabellini 2008a; 2008b). Trust and formal institutions are considered to be two 
different transaction cost reducing channels and  as such serve as substitutes. Anderson and 
Young (2006) argue that country differences in contract enforcement, i.e. formal institutions, 
create uncertainty concerning the expected payoff from a trade transaction. Although institutions 
like the International Court of Arbitration are supposed to alleviate this type of disputes, the 
ultimate enforcement power resides with national courts. Since traders cannot foresee when and 
where economic disputes will happen, they face uncertainty as to which national court will 
enforce the contract. When  heterogeneity in judicial quality creates uncertainty, informal 
channels, such as trust, may then have a significant effect on trade. Alternatively, when formal 
                                                           
1 See Beugelsdijk and Maseland (2011) for an overview. institutions function properly, the trust channel is arguably  less important. It is against this 
background that we explore the nature of the relationship between trust and formal institutions. 
We do so in the context of bilateral trade, because that allows us to relate trust that one group has 
in another group to the intensity of market transactions between both groups while controlling 
for the quality of institutions in both groups.  
In relating formal institutions and trust to trade, existing studies have either focused on 
formal institutions or on trust, but the interplay between trust and formal institutions has not been 
explicitly considered so far. Most studies have focused on the role of formal institutions. De 
Groot, Linders, Rietveld and Subramanian (2004) and Berkowitz, Moenius and Pistor (2006) 
show that countries with a higher quality of formal institutions trade more. Anderson and 
Marcouiller (2002) report that inadequate formal institutions constrain trade as much as tariffs do. 
By classifying traded goods into differentiated and non-differentiated goods, Ranjan and Lee 
(2004) verify the effect of contract enforcement on the volume of trade in both types of goods 
showing that the impact is larger for differentiated goods. Recent literature examines whether 
institutional quality determines a country’s comparative advantage.  In particular, Levchenko 
(2007) demonstrates  that countries with better institutions specialize in goods that are 
institutionally dependent. Nunn (2007) reports that countries with good contract enforcement 
specialize in the production of goods for which relationship-specific investments are most 
important. Studies investigating how trust affects trade are less common. Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales (2009) show that pairs of European countries with high mutual trust trade more than 
country pairs with low mutual trust. Others test the relationship between trust and trade indirectly, 
such as Rauch (2001) and Rauch and Trinade (2002), who find that co-ethnic business networks 
(characterized by high trust levels) reduce the information costs needed for trading more 
differentiated goods. 
To investigate the relation between trust and formal institutions, we analyze bilateral 
trade patterns in a sample of 16 European countries over the period 1996-2009. Following Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales (2009), we use a historically determined measure of trust based on a 
series of Eurobarometer surveys between 1970 and 1996. The quality of formal institutions is 
proxied using indicators provided by the World Bank. In an otherwise standard gravity equation, 
we show that trust in the trading partners has a significant positive effect on bilateral trade, a 
finding in line with Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009). Moreover, and that is new, our results suggest that this positive trust effect is conditional on the quality of formal institutions. When the 
institutional quality of the importing country increases, leading to a smaller difference in formal 
institutions between the trading countries, the positive effect of trust on trade decreases, and 
eventually becomes insignificant. Simply put, country A will import more from country B when 
the people living in A trust the people living in B more (and vice versa), but the role of trust 
becomes smaller when controlling for institutional quality of country A and B. This effect is 
however asymmetric for importing and exporting countries’ institutional quality, because the 
decline in the effect of trust on trade is less when the exporting country’s institutional quality 
improves. In other words, when country A imports from exporting country B, the trust reducing 
effect in case of formal institutional improvements is larger for the trust that the exporting 
country B has in country A than for the trust that country A has in country B.  
Our most fundamental contribution is that we show that trust and formal institutions 
interact in such a way that they can be considered substitutes, and that this substitution effect is 
asymmetric for the trading partners. Our results imply that by improving the quality of 
institutions countries can offset the negative lack-of-trust effect on trade. Trust matters, but well-
functioning institutions matter even more. This suggests that there is room for policy, and trade 
policy in specific. Whereas recent literature on the role of culture in economics, including the 
literature on trust, seems to suggest that countries are locked in to long run positions related to 
their (un)favourable cultural endowments, our study shows this is not necessarily true in the 
context of trade.  
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our data and 
empirical strategy. The results of our main analysis and of our robustness analyses are presented 
in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Finally, Section 5 concludes and provides a discussion of the 
theoretical and empirical implications of our findings. 
 
2. Data and Sample 
To test whether the effect of culture-rooted bilateral trust on trade is conditional on institutional 
quality, our empirical strategy consists of two steps. First, we deduct the time dimension of a 
series of social surveys conducted discontinuously between 1970 and 1996. This approach 
results in a proxy for trust that captures its time-invariant part. Then, this proxy will be used to examine the effect of bilateral trust on trade after 1995. Since the proxy for trust is generated 
before the sample period used to estimate a gravity model, we make sure the causality runs from 
trust to trade and the trust proxy does not capture institutional well-functioning. The use of this 
time invariant trust variable in the second stage is validated by the fact that trust is largely 
determined by historical factors, which means its time-invariant part will not alter after the 
survey period. 
 
2.1 Time invariant trust 
Trust does not change easily (Guiso, Sapeinza and Zingales, 2008). The measure of bilateral trust 
used in this study is obtained from a subsample of surveys conducted by Eurobarometer in 
various years and countries. The first survey was conducted in 1970 in only five countries while 
the last survey in 1996 included 17 countries. A detailed description of the selected subsample is 
reported in Table 1. In view of data availability and the degree of homogeneity in trading rules 
and income levels, we restrict the analysis to 16 European countries.
2 The weighted average of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland is used as score for the UK. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
In each country, about 1,000 representative individuals were asked the following: “I 
would like to ask you a question about how much trust  you have in people from various 
countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very much 
trust, or no trust at all.” According to Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004), this type of question 
measures generalized trust, which shows how much trust people have towards a random member 
of an identifiable group. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) show that the Eurobarometer 
survey question indeed reports the subjective probability that a random person is trustworthy. It 
differs from personalized trust that people develop through repeated interactions (Greif, 1993; 
Beugelsdijk and Maseland, 2011). Since this study focuses on international trade, it is more 
suitable to use generalized trust.  
                                                           
2 France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Denmark, Ireland, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Greece, 
Spain, Portugal, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Austria. Answers to the above trust question are recoded to 1 (no trust at all), 2 (not very much 
trust), 3 (some trust) and 4 (a lot of trust). Then, they are matched by pairs of countries for each 
year. Since countries differ in their years of participation and the survey methods varied over 
time, there are potential measurement errors that can lead to biased results. Thus, we follow 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) and collapse the dataset by averaging the residuals of the 
regression of Trustijt on calendar-year dummies t. Then, the generated averaged residuals, Trustij, 
will be used to show the trust a representative individual from country i has towards a randomly 
selected individual from country j. Cases are dropped when i is equal to j. The value of Trustij is 
reported in Table 2.  
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
As the data in Table 2 show, systematic differences exist regarding the extent to which 
inhabitants from a country trust  inhabitants from other countries, and  the extent to which 
inhabitants of a country are trusted. People from Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands 
have more trust in people from other countries. This may suggest that people excessively apply 
the level of trustworthiness of their own countrymen to people from other countries, which is 
consistent with the experimental evidence provided by Sapienza, Toldra and Zingales (2007). 
Meanwhile, on average, people in southern Europe are less trusted by inhabitants from other 
European countries. Swedes receive most time-invariant trust from people in other countries in 
the sample, while Portuguese receive the least trust from people in other countries.  
In order to test whether our trust variable is time-invariant, we relate trust to an array of 
historical variables. The Appendix shows the results. Our findings are in line with the conclusion 
of Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009), i.e. our bilateral trust variable is largely determined by 
fixed historical factors. Following Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009), we use this generated 
proxy for trust in our analysis of trade flows.  2.2 Trade data and the gravity model  
The data on commodity trade are obtained from UN Comtrade for the period from 1996 to 
2009.
3 The advantage of this dataset is that it provides bilateral trade statistics among the 16 
countries included in this study. Primacy was given to the commodity trade flows reported by the 
importing country, as that these are more accurate than those from exporting countries (Feenstra, 
Lipsey, Deng, Ma and Mo 2005). Since the focus of this study is on the aggregate trade flow 
between countries, we chose the total trade volume between countries in thousands of US dollars. 
Since we are interested in the transaction cost reducing effect of formal institutions, we 
measure institutional quality by the effectiveness of property rights protection and contract 
enforcement. As our primary measure of institutional quality, we use the “rule of law” indicator 
from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009), which captures perceptions of individuals on the 
effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary and the enforcement of contracts. One advantage 
of this measure is that it reflects the effectiveness of judicial system (de facto judicial quality), 
which differs from de jure judicial quality. Another advantage is that both “rule of law” and 
bilateral trust measure perception of agents. Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009) provide data 
for 1996, 1998, 2000 and sequential years afterwards. In order to test the sensitivity of the results 
to the use of alternative measures of judicial quality, we also use the “legal structure and security 
of property rights” from Gwartney and Lawson (2009) in Section 5 as a robustness check.  
The gravity model used here is developed from Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). It is 
consumption-based and assumes that trade is driven by love of variety instead of resource 
endowments. We use the following regression model: 
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Where LnExport jit is the aggregated export of goods (in logarithm) from country j, the exporter, 
to country i, the importer, in year t. The exporter represents the demand side in the trade context 
                                                           
3 Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) use data from Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma and Mo (2005), which is no longer 
available after 2000. Thus, we use UN Comtrade, which is the original source for Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma and 
Mo (2005). while the importer represents the supply side. We include the usual determinants in a gravity 
model: GDPi(j)t , the logarithm of real GDP per capita in country i (j) in Year t, and Distanceij 
which measures the geographic distance between the importing country i  and the exporting 
country j.  
To test our hypotheses, we add Trustij,  which is measured as explained above. 
Institutional quality is measured as the difference between the institutional quality of country i 
and country j in year t-1, IQijt-1 .We also include the interaction between trust and institutional 
quality, Trustij* IQijt-1. Since international trade can influence the development of legal systems 
(Acemoglu,  Johnson and Robinson  2005) as well, we use IQijt-1 instead of IQijt  to avoid a 
potential simultaneity problem.  
Finally we control for importing-country fixed effects, ki, exporting-country fixed effects, 
j λ , and year fixed effects, Yeart. Xij is a vector of three common determinants in international 
trade: 1) Common border, a dummy for whether country  i  and  country  j  share borders; 2) 
Common language, a dummy for whether country  i  and  country  j  share the same official 
language; and 3) Common legal origin, a dummy for whether country i and country j share the 
same legal origin. The summary statistics of the variables listed above are reported in Table 3. 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
3. Empirical Results 
We first estimate a standard gravity model. All model specifications include exporter-by year 
( j λ *Yeart) and importer-by-year (ki* Yeart) fixed effects. The results are shown in Table 4. In 
model 1, export from country j to country i are regressed upon the levels of their GDP and the 
geographic distance between them. The results are in line with other studies finding that GDP 
significantly affects trade while distance has a negative impact on trade.  
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 In model 2, we add the proxy for trust (Trustij) from the importer towards the exporter to 
the gravity model. We find a positive and significant effect of trust on trade, a result in line with 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009).  The result implies that assuming other variables the same, 
an increase of trust by one standard deviation (0.302, i.e. the trust from Swedes to Italians 
increases to the trust Swedes have in Germans) leads to an increase in trade (i.e. the export from 
Italy to Sweden) by 26 percent. We tried another proxy for bilateral trust, which is simply the 
mean of Trustijt among all the survey years country i participated. The result is robust.  
We use IQijt-1 in model 3 to test whether two trading countries’ judicial quality has an 
impact on trade volumes. Since the gravity model used is consumption-based and is driven by 
the demand side, IQijt-1 is the difference between IQit-1 and IQjt-1. When IQijt-1 is positive, the 
importer is superior to the exporter in terms of effectively protecting property rights and 
enforcing contracts. If it is negative, the exporter has a more effective legal system. As IQijt-1 gets 
more positive, the judicial quality of the importer improves in comparison to the exporter. The 
coefficient for IQijt-1  is positive and significant at the level of 1 percent. It implies that an 
improvement in institutional quality has a positive impact on international trade, a result in line 
with studies showing that formal institutions affect trade. In model 4 we include Trustij and IQijt-1 
simultaneously. The coefficients for both variables are positive and significant at the 1% level. In 
model 5 we test the interaction between trust and formal institutions by adding the interactive 
term Trustij *IQijt-1. The coefficients for Trustij and IQijt-1 have the same sign and significant level 
as in the previous models, while the coefficient for Trustij *IQijt-1 is negative and significant at 
the level of 1%.  
To get a better understanding of the nature of the relationship between trust and 
institutional quality, we calculate the marginal effect of trust on trade. The marginal effect of 
Trustij on LnExport jit is calculated as follows: 








β β                 (2) 
 
With the corresponding estimated standard error: 
1 3 1 3
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 We plot the marginal effect in Figure1 with the associated 95% confidence interval.   
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Note: the figure shows the marginal effect of Trustij on commodity trade flows for various values of IQijt-1. Furthermore, (in 
green) the 95% confidence interval for the marginal effect is plotted.  
 
The marginal effect has a downward slope, meaning that when IQijt-1 increases, the effect 
of trust on trade becomes smaller. More precisely, when the importing country improves the 
quality of its formal institutions, the extent to which bilateral trust promotes trade is reduced. As 
the importer improves its judicial system, the positive effect of Trustij on LnExport jit diminishes. 
Figure 1 also shows that the marginal effect of trust on trade eventually becomes insignificant 
when the importer’s institutional quality is even better than the exporter’s. It means that when the 
importer has a sufficiently good legal system, bilateral trust no longer matters for trade. With an 
effective formal institution in place, the impact of informal institution disappears. 
So far, we just focus on the trust from the demand side (i.e. from country i to country j). 
However, the judicial quality of country i, the importer, may matter more for the country j, the 
exporter. When two countries trade, if the importer has a bad judicial system, the exporter would 
fear the default of his payment. The uncertainty will shy away potential exporters. Thus, we turn 
our attention to the trust from the supply side (Trustji, i.e., the trust from country j to country i). 
The results testing the effect of Trustji, on trade are shown in models 6-8. 
IQijt-1 We add Trustji, to the gravity model in model 6. The coefficient for Trustji, is positive and 
significant at the level of 1%. It is smaller than the standardized beta for Trustij.. It implies that 
the trust from the demand side has a stronger impact on trade and is in line with the assumption 
that trade is demand-driven. Model 7 includes both Trustji and IQijt-1. Similar to model 4, the 
coefficient for Trustji and IQijt-1 are both positive and significant at the level of 1%. In model 8, 
we add the interactive term Trustji*IQijt-1. The coefficients for Trustji and IQijt-1 are still positive 
and significant at the level of 1%, while the coefficient for Trustji*IQijt-1  is negative and 
significant at the level of 1%. Moreover, the standardized beta for Trustji*IQijt-1 is lower than the 
beta for Trustij*IQijt-1.  
Figure 2 plots the marginal effect of Trustji on trade, together with the 95% confidence 
interval. Figure 2 closely resembles Figure 1. Again, the marginal effect has a downward slope, 
meaning that as the institutional quality of the importer improves, the effect of trust on trade gets 
smaller. 
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Note: the figure shows the marginal effect of Trustij on commodity trade flows for various values of Qijt-1. Furthermore, (in green) 
the 95% confidence interval for the marginal effect is plotted.  
 
By plotting the two slopes of Figure 1 and Figure 2 together in Figure 3, we can clearly 
see that the slope of the marginal effect of Trustji on LnExport jit is much steeper than the slope of 
the marginal effect of Trustij on LnExport jit. As the importer improves its judicial system, the 
positive effect of (supply side) Trustji on LnExport jit diminishes faster than the effect of (demand 
IQijt-1 side) Trustji on LnExport jit. The intuition is clear: if the importer has a bad judicial system, the 
exporter would fear the default of his payment, and an improvement in the institutional quality of 
the importer will reduce the required trust of the exporter in the importer more than vice versa.  
In both cases, the confidence interval drops below zero at some point suggesting that the effect 
of trust on trade turns insignificant for high levels of institutional quality. 
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Note: The blue line is the marginal effect of Trustij on LnExport jit, and the red line is the marginal effect of Trustij on LnExportji 
 
4. Robustness checks 
We test the robustness of our main results along several dimensions. First, we include a set of 
additional control variables (i.e. Common border, Common Language, Common legal origin). 
Second, instead of using the lagged institutional quality measure, we use current values. Third, 
we split our sample into two time periods, one before the launch of the Euro, and one after. 
Finally we use an alternative measure of institutional quality. The estimation results are 
summarized in Table 5. The main results (i.e. model 5 and 8 in Table 4) are included as well to 
facilitate comparison.   
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
IQijt-1  
In each panel, we start with the model specification of model 5 in Table 4 (column 1), 
and then the model specification of model 8 in Table 4 (column 2). Additional controls are added 
to the lower row of each panel. For brevity, only the coefficients and standard errors for Trustij 
(Trustji), IQijt-1 and their interactive terms are reported. 
 
Main models with additional controls 
The first row of Panel A reports the main results of model 5 and 8 in Table 4 in column 1 and 2. 
In the second row, three additional controls (i.e. Common border, Common Language, Common 
legal origin) are added to the models in the first row. Since these variables are also determinants 
for Trustij (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2009), adding these controls rules out that the effect of 
trust on trade is merely due to its connection with these three variables. The coefficients for the 
three controls are both positive and significant at the level of 1 percent. It shows support for the 
existing literature suggesting that similar institutions and familiarity promote trade (De Groot, 
Linders, Rietveld and Subramanian 2004).  
Moreover, the coefficients for Trustij and IQijt-1 have the same sign and significant level 
as in model 5. The coefficient for Trustij*IQijt-1 is still negative and significant at the level of 10 
percent. When concerning the demand side, the coefficients for Trustji, IQijt-1 and their interactive 
term, Trustji*IQijt-1, have the same signs and significance level as in model 8. Thus, our main 
findings are not driven by the fact that some trading partners share common language, common 
border or common legal origin. 
 
Current values of institutional quality  
In the main results, we used the lagged value of IQijt instead of its current value to test how the 
difference in institutional quality influences the marginal effect of trust on trade. In Panel B, for 
the whole sample period, we investigate whether our main results are sensitive to the use of IQijt 
instead of IQijt-1. Comparing Panel B with Panel A suggests that the results are quite robust. The 
coefficients for Trustij and Trustji are significantly positive, with and without additional controls. 
One of our key findings that the standardized beta for Trustji*IQijt-1 is significantly below zero is 
also supported. Although Trustij*IQijt-1 still has a negative coefficient, it is not significant from zero. The reason may be that trade and institutional quality interact with  each other. The 
endogeneity problem leads to a biased estimate. 
 
Results for the period 1996-2000 
In Table 4, we assumed  the launch of the Euro currency does not influence how trust and 
institutional quality affect trade. However, this might not be true. Thus, we separate the whole 
sample into two periods: the period before 2001 (1996-2000) and the period afterwards (2001-
2009). Then, we redo the regressions separately for each period.  
Estimating models in the first period with IQijt-1 from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2009) leaves us with observations for 1997 and 1999 only. Still, the coefficients for Trustij and 
Trustji are still significant and positive with and without additional controls. However, while 
Trustji*IQijt-1  still has a strongly negative  and significant coefficient, the coefficient for 
Trustij*IQijt-1 is negative but insignificant. Although data is only available for two years before 
the launch of the Euro, the results from Panel C suggest that our main results as reported in Table 
4 are robust. 
 
Results for the period 2001-2009 
The results for the period from 2001 to 2009 show that the coefficients for Trustij, IQijt-1 and 
Trustji are significant both with and without additional controls. Meanwhile, the coefficients for 
the interactive terms (Trustji*IQijt-1 and Trustii*IQijt-1) are both negative and significant. More 
importantly, the coefficient of Trustji* IQijt-1 is much lower than that of Trustji*IQijt-1. The results 
confirm the main results as reported in Table 4. 
 
Alternative indicator of institutional quality 
The alternative measure of judicial quality, “legal structure and security of property rights”, is 
developed by Gwartney and Lawson (2009).  It is constructed by using multiple other studies, 
including Global Competitiveness Reports, International Country Risk Guide, and World Bank’s 
Doing Business surveys. It covers several dimensions, such as judicial independence, impartial 
court and legal enforcement of contracts. It is available every 5 years for the period from 1970 to 
1995. From 2000 onwards, the proxy is reported for each sequential year. Thus, we can only use it for the second period, 2001-2009.  For this  period, the two proxies for judicial quality, 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009) and Gwartney and Lawson (2009), have a correlation of 
90.81 percent. The estimation results in Panel E are largely in line with the results in Panel D. 
Again, both Trustji and Trustji have a positive coefficient that is significant at 1 percent level, with 
or without additional controls. While the interactive term, Trustji*IQijt-1,  has a negative 
coefficient that is significant at the level of 1 percent, the coefficient for Trustij*Qijt-1 is not 
significantly different from zero. In general, our main findings do not change if we use this 
alternative proxy for institutional quality. 
5. Conclusions  
How does institutional quality influence the effect of trust on trade? This study does not only 
find that both institutions and trust matter for trade, but also suggests that the effect of trust on 
trade depends on whether the importing country’s judicial quality is sufficiently good for the 
exporting country. When the importing country does not have good legal institutions, there is 
uncertainty  concerning potential expropriation and defaults. This kind of uncertainty makes 
traders rely on informal institutions, such as trust (Williamson 2000), to assess future payoffs. 
Trust will make people believe that traders from another country will take beneficial actions 
(Child 2001). When the importing country improves its formal institutions, traders rely less on 
trust. Moreover, our results suggest that exporters shift their reliance on trust to the judicial 
system faster than importers. The reason is not hard to understand. When the importing country 
has a malfunctioning judicial system, the exporter is the expropriation target. 
Our results are robust to the use of different proxies and different sample periods. Thus, 
our finding generally suggests that formal institutions and informal institutions are substitutes in 
the setting of international trade. Under the absence of formal institutions, traders base their 
decisions on informal institutions. When well-functioning institutions are in place, the effect of 
informal institutions disappears. Our findings complement  those of Ahlerup,  Olsson  and 
Yanagizawa (2009), who show that the effect of trust on economic growth is conditional in the 
quality of institutions.   
Our study also has important policy implication. Whereas recent literature on the role of 
culture in economics, including the literature on trust, seems to suggest that countries are locked 
in to long run positions related to their cultural endowments, our study shows this is not necessarily true in the context of trade. While Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) show the 
disadvantage in trade for countries that receive little trust, our findings imply that countries can 
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Table 1. List of Surveys from Eurobarometer 
No.  Country Sampled  Number of years present in Survey  Years Present 
1  Austria   1  1996 
2  Belgium   8  1970, 1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1996 
3  Denmark   7  1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1996 
4  Finland   2  1993, 1996 
5  France   8  1970, 1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1996 
6  Greece   6  1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1996 
7  Ireland   7  1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1996 
8  Italy   8  1970, 1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1996 
9  Netherlands   8  1970, 1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1996 
10  Norway   1  1993 
11  Portugal   5   1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1996 
12  Spain   5   1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1996 
13  Sweden   1  1996 
14  Great Britain  7  1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1996 
15  Northern Ireland  7  1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1996 
16  (West)Germany  8  1970, 1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1996 
      Source: http://www.gesis.org/dienstleistungen/daten/umfragedaten/eurobarometer-data-service/ 20 
 
Table 2. Matrix for time invariant trust 
Country i  Aus  Bel  Den  Fin  Fra  Gre  Ire   Ita  Net  Nor  Por  Spa  Swe  UK   Ger  Average 
Austria    0.145  0.147  0.138  -0.178  -0.282  -0.25  -0.37  0.149  0.201  -0.305  -0.218  0.249  -0.212  0.29  -0.035 
Belgium  0.033    0.219  0.116  0.165  -0.343  -0.041  -0.352  0.13  0.112  -0.26  -0.203  0.191  0.087  -0.005  -0.011 
Denmark  0.416  0.397    0.399  0.074  -0.179  0.232  -0.254  0.54  0.702  -0.115  -0.13  0.607  0.43  0.309  0.245 
Finland  0.49  0.273  0.498    0.114  -0.124  0.124  -0.293  0.341  0.682  -0.128  -0.196  0.548  0.38  0.09  0.2 
France  -0.097  0.284  0.177  0.111    -0.257  -0.067  -0.325  0.156  0.171  -0.195  -0.111  0.192  -0.214  -0.009  -0.013 
Greece  -0.478  -0.186  -0.225  -0.381  -0.012    -0.243  -0.453  -0.235  -0.4  -0.189  -0.074  -0.291  -0.449  -0.495  -0.294 
Ireland  0.128  0.142  0.202  0.115  0.02  -0.287    -0.137  0.214  0.127  -0.136  -0.147  0.119  0.017  -0.034  0.025 
Italy  -0.137  -0.149  -0.085  -0.016  -0.094  -0.388  -0.415    -0.018  -0.021  -0.463  -0.15  0.085  -0.243  -0.151  -0.16 
Netherlands  0.101  0.396  0.506  0.449  -0.031  -0.202  0.009  -0.401    0.502  -0.051  -0.146  0.538  0.24  0.081  0.142 
Norway    0.36  0.714    0.117  -0.293  0.19  -0.17  0.448    -0.22  -0.253    0.452  0.178  0.139 
Portugal  -0.672  -0.136  -0.139  -0.621  0.106  -0.388  -0.29  -0.249  -0.1  -0.581    -0.21  -0.558  -0.133  -0.265  -0.303 
Spain  -0.149  -0.071  -0.068  -0.092  -0.427  -0.334  -0.231  -0.195  0.047  -0.006  -0.291    0.035  -0.504  -0.142  -0.173 
Sweden  0.727  0.434  0.768  0.691  0.239  0.075  0.46  0.01  0.534  0.85  0.166  0.056    0.632  0.329  0.426 
UK  0.08  0.108  0.312  0.147  -0.427  -0.261  -0.118  -0.288  0.339  0.228  -0.073  -0.323  0.198    -0.222  -0.022 
Germany  0.184  0.049  0.188  0.046  0.091  -0.276  -0.196  -0.393  0.128  0.123  -0.31  -0.132  0.194  -0.069    -0.027 




Table 3. Summary statistics 
Variable   Description   Obs     Mean      S. D.     Min    Max  Source 
LnExportjit 
 
Log of export (in thousands of USD) from country j to country i in 
year t 
 2828   14.839  1.608  10.015  18.552  UN comtrade 
Distanceij  Log of distance in kilometers between the major cities (mainly, 
capital cities) of the respective countries. 
2828  7.081  0.642  5.153  8.121  Jon Haveman’s website: 
http://www.macalester.edu/research/e
conomics/ 
GDPi(j)t  The natural logarithm of GDP per capita of country i(j) in year t    2520   10.164  0.237  9.528  10.896  PWT 6.3 
Trustij  The averaged residuals of regressing the mean of answers to the 
trust question from country j to country i in survey year t on 
calendar-year dummies t 
 2787   0.010  0.302  -0.672  0.850  Eurobarometer 
IQijt [1]  The difference between the institutional quality of country i and 
country j in year t (IQit-IQjt ), where IQi(j)t is the de facto judicial 
quality of i(j) in year t 
 2100   0  0.593  -1.659  1.659  Kaufmann,  Kraay  and Mastruzzi 
(2009) 
IQijt [2]  The difference between the institutional quality of country i and 
country j in year t (IQit-IQjt ), where IQi(j)t is the de facto judicial 
quality of i(j) in year t 
 1680  0  1.532  -3.900  3.901  Gwartney and Lawson (2009) 
Common language   A  dummy for whether country  i  and country  j  share the same 
official language 
 2828   0.028  0.165  0  1  Jon Haveman’s website 
Common border  A dummy for whether country i and country j share borders   2828   0.148  0.355  0  1  Jon Haveman’s website 
Common legal origin  A dummy for whether country i and country j share the same legal 
origin 
 2828  0.275  0.447  0  1  Djankov,  McLiesh  and Shleifer 
(2007) 22 
 
Table 4. Main Results 
LnExportjit  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Distanceij  -0.960***  -0.843***  -0.942***  -0.833***  -0.837***  -0.879***  -0.861***  -0.838*** 
  0.0231  0.0234  0.0366  0.0357  0.0356  0.0250  0.0387  0.0397 
GDPit  -115.1***  -104.3***  -0.706**  -1.296***  -3.005***  -93.00***  -1.583***  -1.804** 
  31.17  29.10  0.356  0.438  0.333  29.87  0.470  0.716 
GDPjt  38.47***  104.3***  1.333***  1.513***  3.057***  24.84***  2.006***  2.050*** 
  10.22  29.10  0.287  0.480  0.420  7.804  0.450  0.550 
Trustij    0.859***    0.876***  0.772***       
    0.0653    0.0904  0.0987       
IQijt-1      1.256***  1.521***  1.690***    1.516***  1.477*** 
      0.144  0.161  0.174    0.153  0.296 
Trustij* IQijt-1          -0.411***       
          0.158       
Trustji            0.640***  0.701***  0.961*** 
            0.0663  0.0975  0.107 
Trustji* IQijt-1                -1.210*** 
                0.194 
Exporting-country fixed effects*Years  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Importing-country fixed effects*Years  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations  2520  2484  1260  1251  1251  2484  1241  1241 
R-squared  0.931  0.937  0.930  0.937  0.937  0.937  0.936  0.939 
Robust standard errors in the second row while p < 0.1* p < 0.05** p < 0.01***. All regressions include Exporting-country fixed effects*Years 
(dummies) and Importing-country fixed effects*Years (dummies),since the F-tests for those fixed effects suggest they are jointly significant at 1 percent. 23 
 
Table 5. Robustness Checks 
    Column (1)      Column (2)   
    IQijt-1  Trustij  Trustij* IQijt-1  IQijt-1  Trustji  Trustji* IQijt-1 
Panel A: Main Model                         
Without Control Variables  1.69 (0.17)***  0.77 (0.10)***  -0.41 (0.16)***  1.48 (0.30)***  0.96 (0.11)***  -1.21 (0.19)*** 
With Control Variables  0.29 (0.08)***  1.39 (0.14)***  -0.25 (0.13)*  1.43 (0.30)***  0.42 (0.09)***  -1.12 (0.17)*** 
Panel B: Qijt(Kaufmann et al., 2009)                         
Without Control Variables  36.44 (10.10)***  0.84 (0.08)***  -0.10 (0.12)  30.30 (10.33)***  0.81 (0.08)***  -0.70 (0.13)*** 
With Control Variables  46.09 (10.16)***  0.45 (0.06)***  -0.01 (0.10)  2.94 (1.09)***  0.39 (0.07)***  -0.84 (0.11)*** 
Panel C: Qijt-1 (Kaufmann et al., 2009), 96-00                         
Without Control Variables  -0.13 (0.17)  0.86 (0.17)***  -0.20 (0.28)  -1.49 (0.18)***  0.78 (0.18)***  -1.02 (0.30)*** 
With Control Variables  -0.39 (0.18)**  0.47 (0.14)***  -0.10 (0.25)  -1.69 (0.18)***  0.34 (0.15)**  -1.17 (0.26)*** 
Panel D: Qijt-1(Kaufmann et al., 2009), 01-09                         
Without Control Variables  -0.83 (0.18)***  0.72 (0.12)***  -0.52 (0.19)***  1.47 (0.29)***  1.06 (0.13)***  -1.32 (0.25)*** 
With Control Variables  1.49 (0.29)***  0.19 (0.09)**  -0.33 (0.15)**  1.42 (0.31)***  0.45 (0.12)***  -1.08 (0.22)*** 
Panel E: Qijt-1 (G & L, 2009), 01-09                   
Without Control Variables  -0.31 (0.28)  0.84 (0.09)***  -0.19 (0.47)  -0.18 (0.28)  0.81 (0.09)***  -0.26 (0.05)*** 
With Control Variables  -0.26 (0.26)  0.44 (0.07)***  0.02 (0.04)  -0.20 (0.25)  0.37 (0.07)***  -0.30 (0.04)*** 
Robust standard errors in the second row while p < 0.1* p < 0.05** p < 0.01***. All regressions include Exporting-country fixed effects*Years 
(dummies) and Importing-country fixed effects*Years (dummies),since the F-tests for those fixed effects suggest they are jointly significant at 1 percent.24 
 
 
Appendix. Determinants of Trust 
To prove that trust is largely cultural-rooted and time invariant, we follow Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales (2009) and explain bilateral trust with match-specific variables. These match-specific 
variables are historical and do not vary over time. Additionally, both country-of-origin fixed 
effects and country-of destination fixed effects are included. Country-of-origin fixed effects are 
used to control for the fact that people apply the level of trustworthiness of their own countrymen 
towards people from other countries (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter 2000; Sapienza, 
Toldra and Zingales 2007). The regression model for bilateral trust takes the following form: 
ij ij j i ij X k Trust ε β λ + + + =          (A1) 
Where  ki  is the country-of-origin (where trust originated) fixed effect,  j λ  is the country-of 
destination (where trust is received) fixed effect, and Xij is the match-specific variables that are 
rooted in culture and can explain bilateral trust. The values for Xij depend on country pairs.  
  According to Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009), countries differ in their trust toward 
the same population for several possible reasons. One is the difference in the information sets 
countries possess: better information leads to a more accurate estimate. An alternative is that 
some sort of cultural-rooted bias can be passed over several generations and form the perception 
of trustworthiness today. To capture the two possible reasons, we select both proxies for 
information and proxies for cultural similarity. Table A1 offers a description of all the match-
specific variables used. 
  The proxies for information include the geographic distance (Distanceij) between the two 
countries, a dummy variable indicating whether two countries share the same official language 
(Common language), the commonality between two languages, and a dummy variable indicating 
whether two countries share a common border (Common border).  To capture the commonality 
between two languages, we use a measure (Linguistic common roots) created by Fearon and 
Laitin (2003). It is based on a count of the number of common branches two languages share in 
the language trees reported by Ethnologue.com. As two languages share more common branches, 
fewer efforts are needed for citizens from one country to understand the language used in another 
country.  25 
 
  The proxies for culture can be further categorized into three groups: 1) religious 
similarity (Religious distance); 2) ethnic distance (Somatic distance, Genetic distance) and 3) 
interactions in past history (War). To calculate religious distance, we obtain the percentage of 
people belonging to each religious denomination in one country from Alesina, Devleeschauwer, 
Easterly,  Kurlat  and Wacziarg  (2003). To take into account the level of fragmentation, the 
measure for religious distance has the following form: 











             (A2) 
where  w j i ) ( ρ represents the fraction of individuals in country i (j) who have religion w. 
  Two measures are used to capture ethnic distance. The first is Genetic distance between 
indigenous populations developed by Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi and Piazza (1996). It measures 
differences in the genetic composition between two populations by summing the differences in 
frequencies of these polymorphisms.
3 Secondly, Somatic distance developed by Guiso, Sapienza 
and Zingales (2009) is used to account for the fact that people trust people who look like them 
more  than those who do not (DeBruine  2002). Furthermore, we adopt  the classification of 
Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) classification and construct a dummy variable (Common 
legal origin) equal to one if the countries share the same legal origin. The last measure (War) for 
historical interactions captures the conflicts between countries. Presumably, countries with a 
long history of wars and conflict will mistrust each other. We compute the number of years a 
country pair has been in a war between 1816 and 1970 by using the COW (Correlates of War) 
dataset. Although including wars before 1816 will provide us with more incidences, it is hard to 
believe that those wars are relevant. European countries began to have their current shape after 
1800. Another advantage of this dataset is that it provides detailed information on where the 
battles took place and which states were involved. By using this information, we took the border 
change into consideration. 
  Table A2 includes all the regressions. Both country-of-origin and country-of-destination 
fixed effects are included. In column (1), we use all the match-specific variables. To improve the 
model, we take a general-to-specific model selection procedure. Starting with the model 
specification in column (1), the least significant variable from the regression is dropped one at a 
                                                           
3 The calculation for for this measure is similar to eq. (A2), which measures religious distance. 26 
 
time. The procedure ends when only significant variables remain. The result is reported in 
column (2).  
  In column (2), only three variables remain significant. Countries with a long history of 
conflicts and wars will have a tendency to mistrust each other. Moreover, it supports the 
argument of Guiso Sapienza and Zingales (2009) and DeBruine (2002) that people trust people 
who look like them more than those who do not. When two populations lack common somatic 
traits, they tend not to trust each other. The effect of somatic distance on bilateral trust is 
constantly significant at the level of 1 percent. Although the dummy variable indicating whether 
two countries have the same legal origin is only significant at the level of 10 percent, it has the 
expected positive sign. It suggests that the similarity in formal institutions facilitates the 
formation of trust between two populations.   
  In columns (3) to (11), we regress one of the match-specific variables upon Trustij  at a 
time. Most of them are significant at the level of one percent, except the dummy variable 
indicating whether two countries share the same official language and genetic distance. One 
reason is that not many European country pairs have the same official language. The effect of 
linguistic similarity on trust can be verified by the coefficient for linguistic common roots. This 
variable is not only statistically significant at the level of one percent but also economically 
significant. Moving from having none common branches in the language tree to sharing one 
common branched would improve one population’s trust upon another by 0.262.  
  By using the model specification in column (2), Trustij  can be largely explained.   
Moreover, when one match-specific variable is regressed upon Trustij at a time, most of them 
tend to be significant and have the expected sign.  Since country-of-origin and country-of-
destination fixed effects are time-invariant as well, we conclude that Trustij does not vary much 




Table A1. Descriptive statistics of data used in the appendix
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Source: 
Trustij  207  0.00738  0.301656  -0.67224  0.849558  Eurobarometer 
Common language (Official)  207  0.028986  0.168173  0  1  Jon Haveman’s website 
Distanceij (Geography)  207  7.086713  0.643405  5.153484  8.120583  Jon Haveman’s website 
Common border  207  0.140097  0.347929  0  1  Jon Haveman’s website 
War  207  1.024115  2.139889  0  10.58356  COW version 3.0 
Religious distance  206  0.459115  0.277538  0.011283  0.851569 
Alesina Devleeschauwer, 
Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg 
(2003) 
Somatic distance  207  9.47343  5.117837  0  20 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 
(2009) 
Genetic distance (fst*1000)  206  55.49029  43.19188  4  204 
Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi and 
Piazza  (1996) 
Common legal origin  207  0.270531  0.445311  0  1 
Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer 
(2007) 
Linguistic common roots  207  0.555161  0.25162  0  0.9  Ethnologue.com 28 
 
Table A2. Determinants of trust 
Trustij  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
War  -0.012**  -0.011**  -0.012*                 
  0.006  0.005  0.006                 
Somatic distance  -0.016***  -0.017***    -0.019***               
  0.003  0.002    0.002               
Common legal origin  0.041  0.047*      0.172***             
  1.254  0.027      0.027             
Common language  0.073          0.097           
  -0.600          0.064           
Distanceij  0.006            -0.104***         
  0.033            0.021         
Common border  0.029              0.119***       
  0.041              0.026       
Religious distance  -0.022                -0.197***     
  0.056                0.043     
Genetic distance (fst*1000)  0.0002                  0.0000   
  0.0003                  0.0003   
Linguistic common roots  0.075                    0.524*** 
  0.120                    0.103 
                       
Observations  205  207  207  207  207  207  207  207  206  206  207 
R-squared  0.846  0.847  0.755  0.841  0.798  0.754  0.775  0.768  0.768  0.751  0.790 
Robust standard errors in the second row while p < 0.1* p < 0.05** p < 0.01***. All regressions include country-of-origin and country-of-destination 
fixed effects, since the F-tests for those fixed effects suggest they are jointly significant at 1 percent. 